Abstract:
The paper discusses the phenomenon of injunctions against third parties that are innocent from the tort law perspective. One such type of injunction, website blocking, is currently appearing in the spotlight around various European jurisdictions as a consequence of the implementation of Article 8(3) of the Information Society Directive and Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive. Website-blocking injunctions are used in this paper only as a plastic and perhaps also canonical example of the paradigmatic shift we are facing: the shift from tort-law-centric injunctions to in rem injunctions. The author of this paper maintains that the theoretical framework for the latter injunctions is not in the law of civil wrongs, but in an old Roman law con-
A. European Union law
1 The last two years in Europe were marked by an interesting growing enforcement practice of privately litigated website blocks. In more than eight European jurisdictions, various blocking orders were reportedly issued. 1 The website-blocking cases are usually civil proceedings of private plaintiffs holding copyright or trademark rights against the Internet access providers, who as defendants are asked to employ certain technical means to make the access to disputed websites more difficult for its subscribers (an uncircumventable website block is technically impossible). In these cases, the plaintiffs invoke injunctions against Internet access providers who are not liable in terms of tort law. The vehicle used to receive such injunctions is the national implementation of Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive (for copyright and related rights) and the third sentence of Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive (for other intellectual property rights).
I. Injunctions against intermediaries
2 The wording of the relevant part of the provision of the Enforcement Directive reads:
Member States shall also ensure that rightholders are in a position to apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe an intellectual property right.
3 Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive is identical. The only change is a reference to 'copyright or related right' instead of 'intellectual property right' at the end of the sentence. Practical consequence s of these two provisions were rather latent until very recently. A common reading of Article 11 was based on recital 23: 4 EU Member States thus implemented various conditions enabling such injunctions against intermediaries whose services are used by third parties to infringe intellectual property rights. It was by no means clear whether the injunctions should disregard the tort law boundaries at all. This common reading, however, was recently challenged by a decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in L'Oreal v eBay C-324/09. In this case, the Court faced this question:
[This] provision requires the Member States to ensure that the operator of an online marketplace may, regardless of any liability of its own in relation to the facts at issue, be ordered to take, in addition to measures aimed at bringing to an end infringements of intellectual property rights brought about by users of its services, measures aimed at preventing further infringements of that kind.
5 CJEU used a contextual reading of Article 11 to point out that injunctions against intermediaries stipulated in the third sentence differ from 'injunctions which may be obtained against infringers of an intellectual property right' (injunctions against infringers) as stipulated in the first sentence of the very same provision (para 128). From how CJEU rephrased the submitted question (above), it becomes clear that the Court does not intend to limit injunctions by any liability in the tort law. One could argue that injunctions against infringers refer only to direct infringers, i.e. persons who themselves act against the scope of the right, and thus injunctions against intermediaries can as a separate category require a secondary liability in the tort law; however, from reading the subsequent paragraphs of the judgment (paras 134, 144) this becomes rather unconvincing. The European Commission also seems to have a clear reading of this provision that goes exactly in this direction. In the official report on the application of the Enforcement Directive, 2 it inter alia says the following: 4 Despite the efforts of the CJEU, 5 however, secondary liability is still perceived as a domain of the national law. In other words, injunctions have to be provided irrespective of something that is not defined. Member States thus don't have a common line which these injunctions should overstep. As a consequence, in a country with no or very limited secondary liability, injunctions against intermediaries can in great part also fulfil functions of the missing or underdeveloped domestic tort law (without compensation claims, of course). In the country with broad secondary liability on the other hand, the injunctions can act as a real and visible entitlement extension. and Scarlet Extended C-70/10 were found to go beyond the maximal admissible ceiling. And this brings us back to our case of website blocking. The currently pending case of UPC Telekabel Wien C-314/12 is trying to resolve whether website blocking injunctions are compatible with the maximal standard of the Enforcement Directive. If the CJEU views website blocking as compatible with the maximal standard, the question remains whether it is also part of the minimal required standard, or only an option for the Member States to implement.
[...] it appears that in some Member States it is not possible to issue injunctions unless the liability of an intermediary is establis

B. Paradigm of in rem injunctions
9 Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive and Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive thus stipulate an instrument that is difficult to understand with a pure tort law mind-set. This can also be seen from the quoted official report of the European Commission that explains that these injunctions 'are not intended as a penalty against [intermediaries], but are simply based on the fact that such intermediaries […] are in certain cases in the best position to stop or to prevent an infringement'. The tort law is not about cooperation, however, but compensation. Thus the possibility of injunctions against non-infringing persons (intermediaries) as well might seem a conceptually unexplored concept. And partially it is. In this paper, however, I argue that for civil law jurisdictions, 7 strong theoretical foundations for this paradigm of injunctions can be found outside of the intellectual property law, in the system of protection of tangible property in some civil law countries. The concept to which I refer to as in rem injunctions.
I. In rem actions
10 Injunctions with in rem character were originally a civil law doctrine. 8 It developed from the Roman law concepts of rei vindicatio and actio negatoria as a complex way of protecting tangible property. 9 In rem injunctions today represent a separate system of the tangible property protection with its own scope and characteristic features. This system of injunctive protection operates independently next to other two systems of property protection, i.e. tort law and unjust enrichment.
11 In Roman law, one of the in rem actions was particularly important. It was called rei vindicatio, i.e. a legal action by which the plaintiff demands that the defendant return a thing that belongs to the plaintiff. Rei vindicatio, as opposed to the common law concept of conversion, did not rely on any tortuous obligation that arose in the meantime between plaintiff and defendant, but on the rightholder's exclusive legal power over the tangible object of protection (res). 10 Such an action would thus focus on a factual situation of disharmony between law and reality, not on a person and his conduct that led to that situation. Common law, on the other hand, would rely on a tort of conversion focusing on a person who triggered the situation and hois conduct. 11 This conceptual difference yields different results in some cases. For instance, if a ball is blown into a garden by the wind, under rei vindicatio, the owner of the garden automatically has a legal duty to provide the ball back to its owner. Under the tort of conversion, as long as the garden owner doesn't know about it, such a legal duty cannot arise. It will arise only after he learns about the situation and subsequently does nothing, which as a voluntary action (omission) will qualify him for such liability in a tort and thus create an obligation upon which the plaintiff can then rely. 12 12 Of course, Roman law did not use these concepts as we know them today in some countries (e.g. France, Germany, Austria and Slovakia). However, an important understanding of the in rem claim already existed. This understanding was later extended to actio negatoria, i.e. a legal action by which the plaintiff demands that the defendant refrain from disturbing his property (system of injunctions). In fact, actio negatoria and rei vindicatio can be seen as one system of complex injunctive protection of a tangible property. 13 However, some countries (e.g. France) with an in rem understanding of rei vindicatio would rather use a tort-law-centric approach to actio negatoria. This means that they will focus on a person and his conduct to trigger injunctions, not on a situation. And such person will be defined by the external tort law system. In other countries, however, actio negatoria would be firmly established as an in rem action (Germany, Austria and Slovakia).
14 These countries would thus not only protect against those who disturb property by their conduct (disturberby-conduct), but also against those who disturb it by their mere status (disturber-by-status), such as being the owner of a garden where a ball was blown by the wind. This extended radius of addresses of injunctions to disturbers-by-status is one of the consequences of this concept, that is of our interest here. Although it might seem that all disturbers-by-con-duct will be covered by tort-law-linked injunctions, it is not necessarily the case (see below). 13 The core distinguishing feature between a tort-lawcentric view of injunctions and in rem injunctive protection, therefore, is the notion of an 'action in rem' as a remedy of law of property and not law of torts. As Professor Maduro explains, 15 at the core of an action in rem is a right in rem as a direct power over the res (thing) that can be raised erga omnes and not an obligation involving a specific debtor. If one can say that such a right entails an 'obligation', it is merely an obligation on the whole world not to interfere with it without the consent of the owner. 16 In the right in rem, the power of the owner over the thing is central -the power to the exclusion of all unauthorised interference with that res (thing). In the right in personam, on the contrary, it is the legal obligation that binds specific persons which is central, e.g. tort law obligations. 17 Therefore, in an action in rem relating to immovable property, the plaintiff invokes the right to establish its extent, content, possible charges, servitudes or other restrictions that may limit it and to protect the estate against any interference incompatible with the prerogatives inherent to his right. As Professor Maduro states in his opinion in the ČEZ C-343/04 case: 14 A common law understanding of in rem actions greatly differs and is more of a procedural nature. It derives its meaning from the fact that the lawsuit targets only an object, without naming any real person as a defendant. 19 It is thus possible that an action in rem, under a common law understanding, is in fact a regular in personam action in a civil law system, 20 and that an action in rem in a civil law system is an in personam action for common law lawyers. For instance, website blocking is a regular in personam action under a common law understanding, but for a civil law lawyer, as I suggest, it should be seen as an in rem action, because it in fact asserts a freedom from foreign interference that would otherwise amount to a limitation to the right of ownership, without assessing any wrongfulness. 
II. Different paradigms of injunctions
15 When I speak of a tort-law-centric view of injunctions, I do not intend to say that injunctions are necessarily seen as a monolithic remedy of law of torts in respective countries. What I mean to say is that they are not seen as a remedy materializing the right that originates directly in the source of the right, but rather as a cause of action defined by an external system -the tort law. I also use this term only as a prototype for other absolute rights, regardless of whether they are considered to be a part of property or not (e.g. personality rights). Injunctions in the property law in various countries oscillate between a remedy from the law of property and a remedy from the law of torts. Helmut Koziol, for instance, writes 22 that
[...] it is almost generally accepted that the primary aim of tort law is the compensation of loss suffered by the victim. As far as I am aware, the widespread opinion is that injunctions are not a subject of tort law and that they need fewer requirements than claims for compensation.
16 Depending on the legal system, one of the obvious less strict requirements Koziol refers to is that damage or fault, unlike in the law of torts, is not required to trigger injunctive relief. 23 In other countries, injunctions are furthermore not limited by the tort law notion of delictual capacity of persons. 24 Or even in some countries, injunctions would not be considered pure obligations but legal relationships sui generis, with a different applicability of certain rules of the law of obligations (e.g. inapplicability of rules on prescription or rules on discharge from the obligation by a subsequent impossibility, etc.). 4
19 In a tort-law-centric understanding, on the other hand, injunction is understood as an in personam claim, i.e. an injunction against the specific person who qualified himself for such liability by his personal conduct. Although an injunction will not require damage, it will often be dependent on the wrongfulness of the act as defined by tort law (an external system). Hence it will focus on the categories of direct infringers and secondary infringers to define the group of persons against whom the action can be brought. As I said before, this is different for in rem injunctions that focus on a situation of disharmony between the factual and legal and which needs to be solved. Persons are taken into account only as an important element when considering the practicability and proportionality of issuing such injunctions. This is especially true because the principle of ad impossibilia nemo obligatur -i.e. nobody is required to achieve the impossible -also has to be respected here.
III. Importance
20 The concept of in rem injunctions realizes de iure the exclusivity of the right of a person to the protected object (res) by enabling enforceability against everyone. With the tort-law-centric system of injunctions, the right is naked (not enforceable) in certain situations, although de iure its exclusionary power is effective towards all (erga omnes). The concept de facto creates an additional layer of injunctions that are provided on the top of what the regular systems with tort law's secondary liability doctrine would gave us. In tort law terms, it gives us a power of injunctions provided against persons who are not only primary and secondary infringers, but also those who are non-infringing (innocent) in a tort law sense. The remedies landscape in such a system looks as seen below (please note: in rem injunctions also cover direct and secondary liability; the picture just shows the entitlement extension in yellow).
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The picture above depicts a remedy landscape in some civil law jurisdictions mostly in regard to a property over tangible objects. The enlargement of this system of protection to other absolute rights, such as intellectual property rights, is not so obvious. This extension cannot be merely mechanical and requires a deeper justification debate because in rem paradigm, by extending the enforceability of the right, also extends the property entitlement. Thereby encroachment upon the constitutional principle of 'everything which is not forbidden is allowed' occurs. Maybe this is the reason why even some European countries (e.g. Austria) with a strong culture of in rem injunctions in a tangible property ( § § 364(2), 523 ABGB), did not initially extend it to the protection of other absolute rights such as intellectual property. The injunctive protection for intellectual property would be rather closely linked to the tort law, and its scope mostly depends on the tort law concepts of tort feasors (primary or secondary infringers). 27 Other countries (e.g. Germany) would also extend in rem injunctions ( § 1004 BGB) outside of tangible property protection, though with such adjustments to its scope and nature that bring it again very close to the tort law system (namely, the tort of negligence for a third party wrongdoing).
IV. Examples
22 Germany and Austria also demonstrate that there is no common understanding of how far such injunctions can extend and what exactly are its preconditions. 28 In Germany, the scope is wider for tangible property than for intellectual property. The scope of injunctions is limited by the notion of a 'disturber' ( § 1004 BGB), which is more broad than the tort law notion of a 'tort feasor'. A disturber in tangible property law can be anybody who either caused a disturbance of the property by his own conduct (disturber-by-conduct) or who causes such a disturbance by a third party in an adequate way, provided that it is possible and reasonable for him to prevent this action (disturber-by-status). 29 The same notion of the disturber was extended to intellectual property law, 30 but at the same time was narrowed in its scope by requiring a certain breach of duty of care. This duty of care, however, is arguably broader than the usual tort law standards of duty of care known from other jurisdictions. 31 23 In Austria, the scope in the property law seems even broader than in Germany. According to the Austrian Supreme Court, injunctions extend not only to the person who caused the disturbance of the property by their own conduct (disturber-by-conduct), but also to any person having the factual and legal possibility to stop the disturbance (disturber-by-status). 32 This notion of injunctions was recently also extended to the protection of personality rights. 33 Interestingly enough, it seems, that although in rem injunctions are not similarly established in intellectual property law where a injunctions are linked to tort liability, 34 Austrian law here allows injunctions outside of the tort law categories as an implementation of the above-mentioned topic-tailored Union law against intermediaries.
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V. Summary 24 In summary, whereas in rem injunctions aim at solving the situation of disharmony between a factual situation and legally granted rights irrespective of wrongfulness, the tort-law-centric view of injunctions concentrates more on the personal wrongful conduct (what stems from the sanctional nature of the law of torts). In rem injunctions assume that the scope of the enforcement of a right is broader than the scope of a right, an assumption which is in fact also shared by secondary liability in tort. However, whereas the law of civil wrongs extends enforcement beyond the scope of the right only exceptionally (as defined by doctrines of secondary liability), in rem injunctions make the enforceability a general rule, to which we have to craft exceptions in the form of (external) enforcement limits. This entitlement extension is then visible to us (see diagram) 36 as injunctions against innocent third parties. 25 The recent demand of right holders for website-blocking injunctions shows that exclusionary protection of the absolute rights by tort law categories can in certain situations fail. This is especially the case where it is impossible or impracticable to identify or sue any of the tort-liable persons due to the crossborder context, the anonymity of tort feasors or merely due to enforcement inefficiency (e.g. massive scale). After all, the tort liability of a non-actor (in the sense of the scope of the right) for an actor's conduct (see diagram above) has its limits based on generally accepted principles of tort (e.g. causality, fault). What right holders see, however, is that there are certain persons in the infrastructure of the Internet economy who have technical and legal means and resources to reduce negative externalities impacting upon their rights, but are too far for the tort law (e.g. Internet access providers).
C. Website blocking injunctions
26 One way of answering their demand for a solution is by rejecting it with the argument that the fact that rights are in some cases practically unenforceable should be seen as an intentional limitation of their entitlement (e.g. similar to copyright exceptions when it comes to the scope of the right, here the limitation applies to the scope of its enforcement). Another way of answering their demand is to undertake a thorough analysis as to whether the extension of such a right is justified. However, the reality of the legislative process and of judicial activism does not follow this approach; therefore, with the Union law legislation explained above, we are already asking this questions ex post. But as I stated at the very beginning, the issue of justification exceeds the scope of this paper. Instead, I will try to illustrate some of the problems of the website-blocking practice as a type of in rem injunction that might be typical for the entire concept, which leads to injunctions against innocent third parties. 28 Justice Arnold thus sees the effectiveness of website blocking in raising transaction costs for users demanding unlawful services. A recent empirical study 39 conducted by IViR, however, suggests that the impact of website-blocking injunctions in copyright cases, and thus the overall effectiveness of injunctions that underlie its justification, might be very small. According to the study, only 5.5% of all customers (approximately 20% of all infringing customers) of affected Internet access providers downloaded less, or stopped downloading altogether, due to website block of The Pirate Bay in the Netherlands. It seems, however, that in Justice Arnold's view, the improvement of the situation of rights holders (the effectiveness of the measure) did not have to be particularly high. This is demonstrated by his comment that 'I agree with counsel for the Studios that the or-der would be justified even if it only prevented access to Newzbin2 by a minority of users'.
I. Effectiveness
29 It should be noted that what applies to copyright does not necessarily apply to other intellectual property rights, especially trademarks. This is because the copyright-infringing content is very often demanded by users, whereas trademark-infringing goods are demanded less often (as trademark law often protects consumers in parallel). Thus users who have to circumvent blocked websites in order to access them might have a higher incentive to overcome barriers (and pay more in transactions costs) when it comes to copyright-protected content that is being blocked, than content infringing upon trademarks.
II. Methods
30 Furthermore, it has to be noted that the technique of website blocking as such, not just the subject matter concerned, has a lot to do with the effectiveness of such measures. Currently, there are three techniques used to block access to certain websites.
• The first and most primitive is DNS blocking, where the Internet access provider merely black-lists certain domain names from its DNS records. This technique can be easily circumvented by both users and targeted website operators. Users need only to use a different provider as a source of DNS records, which is a trivial setting in the Internet browser, or by simply using search engines instead of direct URL entry. 40 A website operator, on the other hand, can change the name of the domain name. This type of block, for instance, was issued by a Danish court in IFPI Denmark v Tele2 to block <allof-mymp3.com>.
• The second method is IP address blocking, where an Internet access provider black-lists certain IP addresses used by the server where the targeted website is stored (used in Dramatico). This technique is relatively more difficult for users to circumvent. They would need to use a special proxy service or VPN to go around this block. The website operator can change his IP address.
• The last technique is called Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), which, unlike the previous two techniques, enables blocking certain URLs in addition to entire webpages. This method is used when the targeted service shares an IP address with other services, or if the specific part of the website is to be blocked (also used in the UK Newzbin II decision). The most significant disadvantage to Deep Packet Inspection is that it may be easily subverted if the packets are encrypted, e.g. using the 'https' protocol. 41 31 Apart from these technical methods, one has to distinguish whether the website block is issued by the court as a fixed order or as an open order. The first means that only the decision-specified domain name, website or IP address will be blocked, whereas the second creates an out-of-court system enabling flexible submission of changed IP addresses or domain names by right holders, often without further judicial review. All these different techniques and types of orders raise numerous problems (see below).
III. Collateral damage
32 Assuming that the combination of different techniques and appropriate subject matter makes website blocking effective and hence improves the situation of the right holders, we should ask whether the situation for the rest of society is worsened only to a lesser extent. Plus, the cumulative effects of other website blocks originating from other right holders should also be taken into account. Website blocking especially raises the problem of respect towards the core values of the democratic society and also of public interest in innovation. This potential collateral damage can in fact reduce the practical societal need for injunctions against innocent third parties, like website blocking, to zero.
33 Website blocking can easily lead to a practice where the website operators whose websites are to be blocked cannot defend themselves before the block is granted and without having a remedy to challenge such blocks ex post. Although it might be more efficient to block the website without notifying the website operator and giving him chance to defend his case, our values embodied in a right to a fair trial shall preclude such scenarios. This is exactly the problem with most of the UK website-blocking injunctions as well. Of all three UK website blocks (Newzbin II, blocking Newzbin; Dramatico Entertainment, blocking The Pirate Bay; and EMI Records, blocking KAT, H33T, and Fenopy), 42 only Newzbin II was initiated after the court decision against the website operator was issued (Newzbin I) and failed to be implemented. In the other two cases, the infringing nature of a website was assessed as a preliminary question. Website operators whose websites were to be blocked were not party to the proceedings and thus could not defend themselves in court. 43 Justice Arnold relied on the following three arguments in his decision in this respect (see para 9-15 of Dramatico Entertainment): i) nothing in the legal bases of the injunctive provision requires a court to do so, ii) other courts did the same, and iii) it would be impracticable, or at least disproportionate, to require the website operator to be part of the proceedings. This type of reasoning is not very convincing from a human rights perspective, however. Also, a website operator, unlike a tenant against his landlord, has no proper compensation cause of action against the Internet access provider. His website is locally banned for the entire country and he has almost no possibility to challenge it. Moreover, it is only a matter of time before right holders start asking for EU-wide website blocks based either on Brussels I or unitary community rights. The court, therefore, in my opinion, has to have an obligation to provide for a fair trial to all parties that are affected in this way, including a targeted website operator.
IV. Right to a fair trail
35 A website operator's right to a fair trial can be interfered with in two of its components: i) access to the court and ii) equality of arms. The main problem of a website block is not only that the court will not hear the website operator in the proceedings, but also that the website operator has no remedy to challenge the block of his website. 44 38 The courts will need to be very sensitive to this. Probably as never before, the remedy as such was vulnerable to the abuse of a right to fair trial, as many of these injunctions are. Based on human rights principles, the courts need to recognize existing enforcement limits as a sort of new safe harbour. These principles can be distilled from the Strasbourg case law. For instance, we could formulate the following enforcement limitation embodying the right to fair trial as an instruction for courts:
If a result of an injunction is decisive for private rights or obligations of a certain person that is not party to the proceedings, the court must not issue an injunction, unless it will be assured that his right to a fair trial is fully guaranteed.
39 This type of (external) defence can then be invoked by courts in many other cases, not only in the practice of website blocking. If, for instance, a plaintiff sues only the domain name authority for the cancellation of a certain domain name, the court must not issue any injunction against the domain name authority, unless the right to a fair trial of a domain name owner is sufficiently guaranteed. 41 Despite that fact that the CJEU then ignored this issue and instead rejected blocking and filtering on the merits after carrying out a balancing exercise between the rights concerned, the issue of quality of the law has to be taken into account when issuing more complicated website-blocking injunctions, such as those involving Deep Packet Inspection of users' communication. Justice Arnold, for instance, who also instituted this technique of website blocking, first assessed different alternatives of website blocking and their collateral damage on others. Nevertheless, his website-blocking orders are still vulnerable to abuse, because they set up an out-of-court system of non-transparent submission of IP addresses and domain names that are not subject to any further judicial review. One may question whether all the subsequent website blocks are still 'provided for by law' as required by the ECHR. As the number of website blocks will be growing, these court-approved website blocks should have a more strict system of checks and balances, e.g. transparency obligations by Internet access providers or periodic review of the implementation. Moreover, website blocks were so far instituted only via court proceedings. In civil law countries, where injunctions are recognised as remedies exercisable also out of the court, one might ask whether the notion of 'prescribed by the law' does not also impose an obligation to exercise it only before the courts. 44 This entire picture of the scope of the injunctions and its human rights problems poses an important question of a hierarchical position of such a remedy in our enforcement systems. During the current consultation, 45 right holders strongly advocated for the following action to be taken:
VI. Legality
VII. Innovation
VIII. Position of the remedy
[...] make clear that the intermediary's liability (or the violation by the intermediary of any kind of duty) is not a pre-condition to an injunction being issued against him with respect to a third party's infringement.[...] The availability of an injunction against intermediaries should not depend on whether the infringer has or has not been identified; nor should the availability of such an injunction be made subject to an obligation for the rights-holder to sue the actual infringer (no rule of subsidiarity).[...] Under appropriate circumstances, injunctive relief against infringers and intermediaries should be available irrespective of whether they have received prior notice. [emphasis mine]
45 In other words, injunctions against an innocent third party, in their view, shall be recognised as an independent remedy that should not require any exhaustion of tort liability, i.e. any proof that tort law remedies failed. 46 Although this is consistent with the concept of in rem actions, it can at the same time distort economic rationale behind existing tort remedies. For instance, it is questionable why innocent parties should bear the costs of cooperation, also in cases where negative externalities of technology are efficiently enough regulated by the tort law instruments (e.g. see the example of 'HomelifeSpain.com' mentioned above). 46 Website-blocking injunctions show several serious problems brought by the expansion of injunctive relief against innocent third parties. The most striking consequences of this paradigmatic shift, however, are concerned with the future of Internet innovation. This is because courts in this system are being turned into standard-setting bodies, a function they avoided when they had only secondary liability doctrines at their disposal. Take the domain name registration system as an example. If this system were created today under the current remedy landscape in the European Union, domain name authorities could be arguably theoretically forced to apply an ex ante screening system (before registration) instead of an ex post dispute system (after registration). This derives from the fact that secondary (tort) liability doctrines were unable to actively force domain name authorities to change their policy of first-come/firstserved registrations (see the Lockheed Martin v NSI case 47 ). With injunctions against innocent third parties in place, however, one can challenge such policy decisions of providers in times when the system is fragile because it is only being formed. When a system is already established and becomes more solid, the courts are usually more reluctant to change it. 48 This also shows that enforcement limits that were set up to prevent similar dramatic scenarios, such as a prohibition of the general monitoring obligation set by Article 15 of the E-commerce Directive, are usually very narrow rules to protect unexpected innovations. 49 For the future, this all again means that courts can substantially change the innovation in the process of its formation. It also means that courts will now move from a 'rubber-stamping' position (assessing whether providers did enough to avoid secondary liability) to a more 'standard-setting' position (actively imposing a new conduct standards and associated costs onto providers).
D. Economic consequences
50
I. Costs 47 The most crucial element in this context is the problem of costs. Shifting the costs from one person to another was so far triggered by some special reasons as defined by tort law. 51 The system of in rem injunctions, however, creates a model where costs can be shifted to others only because they have the factual and legal possibility to do something to minimize infringements. Injunctions against innocent parties thus enable a shift of costs without special reasons. And the costs involved can often be very high. The initial cost of implementing a website-blocking injunction, for instance, is about £5,000, with another £100 for each subsequent notification.
52 According to current practice, this cost is borne by Internet access providers. 48 The growing blocking practice can hence naturally soon lead to an increased price for Internet access. So it is ultimately consumers who will be paying for this kind of enforcement technique. Similarly, in our theoretical example, if an ex ante screening system in respect to domain names were reality, consumers would be the ones who would have to bear the increased costs of compliance forced onto domain name authorities. Innovations can therefore become more expensive. The concerned industry, of course, understands this aspect of injunctions. For industry, the question of injunctions in Europe is becoming more important than liability in tort, especially because existing safe harbours set forth in Articles 12 to 14 of the E-commerce Directive protect them from additional costs possibly incurred by expansion of secondary liability doctrines, but do not protect them from costs resulting from these sort of injunctions. 53 We can illustrate voices of the industry on the example of Yahoo complaints during the hearing about amendment of the Enforcement Directive and debate about Article 11 injunctions: 50 Soon, competition between the two types of remedies might arise. If injunctions against innocent third parties become cheaper due to little resistance from the defendants, then they will be exploited more often and innocent third parties will eventually often bear costs instead of direct or secondary infringers. Moreover, the pursuit of pure right holder self-interest in enforcement might lead to results that are No 13 (concluding inter alia that in the US such injunctions are not possible). 
3
The reference is made to the German doctrine of liability of participator, which is also shared in some other countries such as Slovakia and Austria.
4
In this paper, the term 'secondary liability' means purely tort liability of any person different from the direct infringer (actor), who has to bear the weight of any kind of non-contractual claim for acts of the direct infringer. Secondary liability could be further divided into fault-based secondary liability that requires the breach of a certain duty of care, and nofault-based secondary liability that triggers liability regardless of such a breach.
5
In the recent Donner case, C-5/11, the CJEU read into the autonomous notion of the 'distribution right' arguably also the test for secondary infringements in para 27 of the decision. not efficient from the societal point of view, i.e. it might lead to market failures.
E. Conclusion
51 As Article 8 of ACTA 55 and other initiatives (BTAs)56 show, injunctions against innocent third parties are definitely a trend of the last years, and the European Union is very active in 'exporting it' outside of the old continent. Website blocking is a manifestation of derailing injunctions from the tracks of tort law in the recent jurisprudence. This phenomenon leads to an extension of rights by extending their scope of enforcement against persons that are too far for tort law, but have resources and factual and legal means to reduce the negative externalities. In this paper I argue that the theory behind such an extension can be found in the Roman notion of 'in rem action'. Also, the justification for such an extension should not be mechanical, but subject to a thorough justification analysis. In this respect, I have tried to demonstrate rising problems in the practice of website blocking, especially tensions with the right to a fair trial, legality and costs of injunctions.
52 Although at first sight, injunctions against innocent third parties might seem to be an effective enforcement tool to supplement the deficiencies of tort law in the online environment, these injunctions are very vulnerable to abuse and have a similarly great potential to negatively influence innovation.
In the context of the Internet and intellectual property rights enforcement, derailing injunctions from the tracks of tort law is literally akin to derailing the future of the Internet and its innovation into unknown waters. As maybe never so intensively before, this future has been left in the hands of our courts. This article suggests that if we now shift to this new paradigm of injunctions in the IP law, we should also start discussing new positive intellectual property limitations or other checks and balances, not only on the level of the scope of the right but also on the level of the scope of its enforcement.
53 If readers feel at this point that I have merely raised a lot of questions without furnishing proper answers to them on how to address these challenges, they are certainly right to conclude so. I simply don't have the answers. Yet.
57
(Endnotes) Being called on to determine, specifically for the purpose of applying Articles 21 and 22 of the Brussels Convention, whether Netherlands proceedings brought by owners of goods for compensation for damage suffered by a ship's cargo involved the same subject-matter and cause of action as proceedings subsequently commenced by the same owners in the United Kingdom by arresting the vessel under the Arrest Convention, the English court concluded that the two actions involved the same subject matter, notwithstanding the differences between actions in rem and actions in personam. It arrived at that conclusion by reference to the fact that the subjectmatter of the action against the ship must necessarily be the same as that of the action against the owner and that, if service of the writ of arrest is not acknowledged by the owner, the plaintiff must, in order to obtain a decision against the vessel, prove the owner's liability'. 55 'Each Party shall provide that, in civil judicial proceedings concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights, its judicial authorities have the authority to issue an order against a party to desist from an infringement, and inter alia, an order to that party or, where appropriate, to a third party over whom the relevant judicial authority exercises jurisdiction, to prevent goods that involve the infringement of an intellectual property right from entering into the channels of commerce.' This provision was previously drafted in a more European-style way, when it provided that 'The Parties 56
The proposed text of Bilateral Trade Agreement between EU, Colombia and Peru that in Art. 236 says 'the Parties shall provide that, where a judicial decision is taken finding an infringement of an intellectual property right, the judicial authorities may issue against the infringer an injunction aimed at prohibiting the continuation of the infringement.' As the footnote of the document explains, 'The Parties shall ensure that the measures referred in this paragraph may also apply against those whose services have been used to infringe intellectual property rights to the extent they have been involved in the process.' See <http://www.bilaterals.org/spip. php?article17138>.
